



VULNERABILITY OF NORTH KOREAN FORCES

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Volume II - Korean Scenario and Target Arrays

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
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
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
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
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


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
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BACKGROUND AND CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT

The political demarcation between North and South Korea, since the korean armistice was signed in 1953, continued to be a thorn in the side of Kim Il-Sung of North Korea who advocated the unification of the Korean peninsula on his terms. The heavy emphasis on the need for the withdrawal of U.S. forces suggested that Kim Il-Sung saw the U.S. forces and the presence of the UN command as obstacles to Korean unification. The Korean peninsula divided by its Demilitarized Zone and Demarcation Line is shown on Figure 1.



With the change in government in 1977, China's attitude towards the lin'ted States deteriorated from its friendly discussion attitude to one of verbal attacks against the United States. Furthermore, the lack of gain in the Soviet Union's relationship with the United States over detente and the continued public anouncements of President Carter relative







Figure 1. The Korean peninsula with Demarcation Line


to human rights, brought a steel curtain approach to the Soviet Union relations. Thus, these two countries allied to North Korea gave the mod to the North Korean position of unification.





The general military situation described above sets the stage for the two North Korean Penetration Phases








The first target array developed for the study "North Korean Invantry Division Shallow Penetration Array" and the second target





array "Two North Korean Infantry Division Forces in Deep Penetration Array" are included in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Table 3 provides the target description, target size and target composition for each of the two arrays.

Information contained in these tables is used in the development of acquired target lists and the location of the units in the arrays provides part of the basis for determing the damage to units near the nuclear burst points. The posture and composition of the targets are used to determine levels of incapacitation/damage based upon the weapon effects environments produced by the nuclear attacks.